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Abstract 
 Password has been the most used authentication system these days. However, strong 
passwords are hard to remember and unique to every account. Unfortunately, even with the strongest 
passwords, password authentication system can still be breached by some kind of attacks. 2FYSH is two 
tokens-based authentication protocol designed to replace the password authentication entirely. The two 
tokens are a mobile phone and an NFC card. By utilizing mobile phones as one of the tokens, 2FYSH is 
offering third layer of security for users that lock their phone with some kind of security. 2FYSH is secure 
since it uses public and private key along with challenge-response protocol. 2FYSH protects the user from 
usual password attacks such as man-in-the-middle attack, phishing, eavesdropping, brute forcing, 
shoulder surfing, key logging, and verifier leaking. The secure design of 2FYSH has made 90% of the 
usability test participants to prefer 2FYSH for securing their sensitive information. This fact makes 2FYSH 
best applied to secure sensitive data needs such as bank accounts and corporate secrets. 
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1. Introduction 
Password is a cheapest and the most general authentication method we use today. 
However, good passwords are hard to remember. A good password should be long enough; 
unpredictable; combined with uppercase, lowercase, symbols, and numbers. Based on 
password survey conducted by Hoonakker, et al [1] on 836 employees with the user 
composition of 3% novice users (new computer users), 69% average users (able to use word 
commonly used apps like word processors, spreadsheets, email, browsers), 22% advanced 
users (able to install software, configure settings in app), and 6% expert users (able to install 
OS, write programs and apps), the research founds that 94% of the respondents are not 
practicing the best practice of password usage [1]. In terms of security, password also performs 
badly. Beside passwords are easily guessable, passwords are prone to well-known attacks such 
as brute force, shoulder surfing, key logging, eavesdropping, phishing, and verifier leak. Some 
of the attacks can even beat the strongest passwords. For example, attackers can breach the 
database at the verifier and get the passwords. When the same passwords are used on multiple 
sites, attackers can have access to those sites. 
All approaches for human authentication rely on at least one of the following: Something 
You Know (SYK), Something You Have (SYH), and Something You Are (SYA) [2]. These 
problems on passwords are actually quite solved by the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) 
concept [3-5]. MFA combines two or more authentication factors from the 3 authentication factor 
types. One of the most used forms of two-factor authentication (2FA) is password and one-time 
password (OTP). When using this 2FA combination, users are still required to type the main 
password, then users have to wait for SMS, or open an app, or click certain buttons on a 
dedicated authentication device (token) to get the OTP needed and have to remember them for 
short amount of time to actually enter it to the system. The process just takes too much time and 
is quite hard to learn. Besides the downside of the usability in OTP, OTP actually is still 
technically a password and can be phished [6-10]. 
Meanwhile, NFC cards are widely used in places like universities and offices for 
verifying attendance and building access. Also, the number of cashless transactions using NFC 
cards has increased exponentially over the years. Smartphone manufacturers also producing 
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more smartphones with NFC chip in it. It is estimated that 64% of smartphones will be NFC 
enabled phones by 2018 [11]. Assessing the downsides in password and OTP systems, in this 
research we propose a new authentication protocol called 2FYSH. 2FYSH is a secure-token 
based authentication protocol using two SYH factors which are mobile phones and NFC cards. 
2FYSH also offers the third factor to people who lock their phone with either SYK (pattern lock, 
PIN, password, etc.) or SYA (face recognition, and fingerprint) factor.  
 
 
2. Related Works 
One-time password (OTP) is a password that is valid only after one authentication [12]. 
OTP authentication was created mainly to secure the system from eavesdropping and replay 
attacks on usual password authentication method [13]. RSA SecurID [14] and Google 
Authenticator [15] are well-known examples of OTP implementation. Unfortunately, common 
OTP mechanisms such as [16, 17] have the possibility of vulnerability on the server side. When 
compromised, attackers might obtain the shared secrets and compute the OTP to authenticate. 
Compared to that, 2FYSH protocol stays safe even when the server is compromised and cannot 
be phished-thanks to 2FYSH’s private and public key with challenge-response scheme. In terms 
of usability, 2FYSH acts like requiring users to bring both RSA SecurID and smartphone at the 
same time, but a smartphone and an NFC card is something that user relatively always have 
with them. 
FIDO U2F (Universal Second Factor) has created the login process very easy for users. 
By only presenting the second factor in the form of a USB device and tapping it when the light 
blinks, users can authenticate themselves to the system. Since the USB device acts like a 
physical key, the implementation is usually combined with a PIN. FIDO U2F uses the same 
public and private with a challenge-response protocol [18, 19]. It is still relatively a burden for 
users to bring a USB device all the time with them, compared to 2FYSH that requires the user to 
bring an NFC card which usually is worn as a name tag or placed inside the wallet. The main 
advantages of 2FYSH are that 2FYSH doesn’t require the user to buy any special device, 
compared to the FIDO U2F USB device which still costs some amount money (by  
November 2017).  
Pico [20] is a password replacement authentication proposed by Stajano in 2011. While 
2FYSH is using the same two hardware tokens concept to authenticate, 2FYSH and Pico act a 
little bit different. Pico can have a lot of picosiblings which is recommended to be wearable 
devices such as earrings, watch, and necklaces. To authenticate, Pico device will need to 
communicate actively by sending ping and pong with the picosiblings to unlock the secret key 
located at Pico device. Because of that, Pico supports continuous authentication which means 
when Pico separates from picosiblings, it will automatically log the user out from the system.  
Because Pico is recommended to be a dedicated device with capabilities of camera and 
radio, it requires the user to bring/wear minimum one extra hardware token with them (proposed 
as wearable device). Since Pico and picosiblings need to communicate actively, it will need a lot 
amount of energy which results in the need of frequent charging on the devices (Pico & 
picosiblings). In contrast, 2FYSH only need a smartphone to recharge which should not really 
matter because it is considered normal to recharge a smartphone. 2FYSH also requires the 
user to bring much normal tokens (such as a card compared to techy earrings) for users than 
Pico. Moreover, to use Pico, it is definitely will cost more rather than 2FYSH since all of Pico 
system are some unusual extra dedicated tokens. 
The implementation of 2FYSH is quite similar to Loxin [21] by using public and private 
key with the private key stored in the smartphone. The use of trusted third party is a minus 
score on the security aspect according to Bonneau’s proposed UDS framework [22]. Loxin still 
uses a trusted third party in the system while 2FYSH doesn’t require it. 2FYSH is safe because 
it does not use CA by design and also offers the second protection by the need of presenting an 
NFC card to authenticate. 
 
 
3. Proposed Design 
2FYSH is an abbreviation of “Two Factor (authentication) You Should Have” and read 
as “two fish”. By the name, the protocol is offering two layers of authentication of SYH factor. 
Those two factors are a mobile phone and an NFC card. Simply put, to authenticate to the 
relying party, the user should be able to present a registered NFC card to the mobile phone. 
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The main strength of this authentication protocol is on the two factors of SYH. 2FYSH could also 
be three factors if the users lock their phone with some kind of security such as SYK factor (e.g. 
PIN, password, pattern lock) or SYA factor (e.g. fingerprint, face recognition) factor. The 
additional third factor is considered as not an additional cognitive burden to the user since it is 
frequently used every day. 
2FYSH protocol uses TLS-like public-private key scheme combined with challenge-
response protocol to provide secure authentication. The private key should be stored on the 
mobile phone which has a special key storage hardware called secure element. This way, the 
secrets will be kept secret not only by software but also hardware; thus, preventing any 
(unauthorized) access to the private key even the user has rooted the phone [23, 24]. The NFC 
card used to authenticate will also be secured by encrypting the salt (will be explained further in 
the next section) data with the public key. Requirement: To make sure that the NFC card’s salt 
data could not be compromised, all communication has to be over a secure channel (eg. 
HTTPS, IPSec, etc). Otherwise, 2FYSH becomes one-factor authentication (smartphone only). 
 
3.1. Architecture 
In the 2FYSH protocol, there will be 4 main entities, as shown in Figure 1: 
1. 2FYSH server: A back-end server for 2FYSH service. This back-end server stores the 
2FYSH users’ credentials, generate challenges, verify user authentication. 
2.  2FYSH app: A 2FYSH authenticator application installed on the users’ mobile phone. It can 
also be installed on computers but it will be less practical for the user since computers are 
not designed to be as mobile as mobile phones. This application stores all 2FYSH 
credentials of the user. 2FYSH app also reads the challenge generated by the 2FYSH server 
and sends the authentication response to the server for verifying purposes. 
3. Client: An application which users use that provides the interface to sign up or sign in.  
     This client can be in any form such as desktop/mobile browser, desktop/mobile app. 
4.  NFC card: A token which users need to present to the 2FYSH app in order to sign in.  
     The NFC card will hold a salt data encrypted with the user credential’s public key. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 2FYSH protocol model 
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The data on the client could not be just transferred to the 2FYSH app since they may be 
on separate devices. The 2FYSH protocol also defines some special schemes for data passing 
between the client and the 2FYSH app. 
1.  2D visual code: This scheme is used whenever client and 2FYSH app are separate devices. 
For example: the client is a desktop browser and the 2FYSH app is on the mobile phone 
(always). 
2.  Button (URI link): This scheme is used whenever client and 2FYSH app are on one same 
device. For example: the client is a mobile browser and on the same device with the 2FYSH 
app. 
3.  Directly from the app: This scheme is used whenever the client is the mobile app and 2FYSH 
app functionality is implemented directly in the app. With this, the data sent from the 2FYSH 
server can be directly processed in the app without the need of passing data to the 2FYSH 
app. For example: Facebook mobile app implements 2FYSH protocol directly to the app. 
 
3.2. Registration 
On the registration process, there are two types of data being sent. The first data being 
sent is called registration data, the data is being sent by 2FYSH server to the client. The second 
data is the response data from the client to the server and will be called registration  
response data.  
 
3.2.1. 2FYSH Registration-Parameters 
The registration data sent from server to client will be having 5 key parameters: action, 
username, app ID, challenge, and register portal. Parameter action is to identify “registration” or 
“authentication” action for the client. Since the user may have more than one credential for each 
app (App ID), parameter username is needed for identifying purposes. The challenge is a 
random 128, 192, or 256 bits (encoded to HEX), generated by the 2FYSH server with secure 
random byte generator. All the parameters will be processed by the 2FYSH app and are going 
to be sent to the register portal which acts as service. 
The 2FYSH app will process the data needed and sends back registration response 
data to the server. The registration response data will be having 4 parameters: username, 
challenge, public key, and key handle. The 2FYSH app will process the registration data and 
create a key pair (public and private key). The private key will be stored on the phone’s secure 
element (key store) and the public key is sent through a secure channel to the 2FYSH server. 
Since the private key is stored on a secure element, it will need an alias to call the specific key 
for doing procedures. The alias is created as a random 32, 64, or 128 bits (encoded in HEX) 
and it is called as key handle. The challenge and key handle parameters should be sent in 
encrypted form using private key. 
 
3.2.2. 2FYSH Registration-Stored Data 
Aside from all the data being sent, there will also some data being created and stored 
through the registration process. 
1. Counter: is an integer value with an initial value of 0; stored by both 2FYSH server and 
2FYSH client. The counter will act as the last measure of the security to detect if somehow in 
the future, the system could be broken. Counter value will be incremented by the 2FYSH 
server and the 2FYSH app every successful authentication. Whenever the counter value of 
2FYSH server is larger than the 2FYSH client, there will be a high chance that the 2FYSH 
app has been cloned. 
2. Salt: is a random 32 or 64 bits (encoded to HEX). The value of salt will later be encrypted by 
the 2FYSH server using public key received on the registration process and the encrypted 
value will be written to an NFC card. The card will be issued to the user for authentication by 
the relying party. 
 
3.2.3. 2FYSH Registration-Process 
On the registration process, registration_data will be sent by 2FYSH server to the client. 
The client will then pass the data through the stated data passing schemes (look point 3.2.1). 
The 2FYSH app will receive the data and then create the key pair and the key handle to  
access it. The 2FYSH app will store the credential data needed for authentication and user 
interface (key handle, username, app id, counter=0). After all that, the app will send back 
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registration_response_data to the server. The 2FYSH server will create salt for the 
corresponding credential and store the credential data to its database (username, public key, 
salt, key handle, counter=0). The salt value will be encrypted with public key, and the encrypted 
value will be written to an NFC card. Then, the relying party will issue the NFC card to the user. 
 
3.3. Authentication 
On the authentication process, there are two types of data being sent. The first data 
being sent is called authentication_data, the data is being sent by 2FYSH server to the client. 
The second data is the response data from the client to the server and will be called 
authentication_ response_data. 
 
3.3.1. 2FYSH Authentication-Parameters 
The authentication data sent from server to client will be having 6 key parameters: 
action, username, app ID, challenge, key handle, and authentication portal. The authentication 
response data sent from the client back to the server will be having these 3 key parameters: 
username, challenge+salt, and counter. Challenge+salt is concatenated bits of challenge and 
salt. The value of salt is retrieved by 2FYSH app through the NFC card. Since the NFC card 
only holds the public-key-encrypted value of salt, the app will decrypt it by using the credential’s 
private key (recognized by the key handle). The 2FYSH app stored counter value will also be 
sent to the server. The challenge+salt and counter data will be sent in encrypted form using 
private key. 
 
3.3.2. 2FYSH Authentication–Process 
On the authentication process, authentication_data will be sent by 2FYSH server to the 
client. The client will then pass the data through the stated data passing schemes (look  
point 3.2.1). The 2FYSH app will receive the data and will also wait for the NFC tap to the phone 
to get the encrypted value of salt. By referencing to the key handle, the 2FYSH app will do three 
things: retrieve the current value of counter from the database, decrypt the encrypted salt value 
using its corresponding private key to get the plain salt value, and encrypt the challenge+salt 
value and the counter. The 2FYSH server will decrypt the encrypted data and get the 
challenge+salt value. The authentication process is done on the 2FYSH server. The server will 
concatenate the challenge that had been sent with stored salt value and compare it to the 
challenge+salt value received; and if it matches, the authentication is successful; thus, the 
2FYSH server could set a session/establish a connection to the client. 
 
 
4. Implementation 
We implemented the initial prototype of the protocol design with a web server as the 
2FYSH server, desktop/mobile browser as the client, android application as the 2FYSH 
application, and NTAG215 NFC card. 
 
4.1. 2FYSH Server Implementation 
2FYSH prototype on the server side is using simple web interface. First, the user will 
need to enter the username registered. After that, the browser screen will show a QR code and 
a URI link. The QR code is used when the browser is on the desktop platform. The 2FYSH app 
will have a viewfinder searching for QR code with the 2FYSH data format. The URI link is used 
when the browser is on the same mobile device with the 2FYSH app. The communication data 
used in this prototype implementation is JSON. The JSON data is embedded in the QR code 
and the URI link. 
 
4.2. 2FYSH App Implementation 
The implementation of the 2FYSH app is made as simple as possible. The main 
interface of the app constructed mainly by a camera view as shown in Figure 2. In order to do 
either registration or authentication process, no button is needed to be pressed. The user will 
just need to point the camera to the QR code shown from the browser and it will prompt for NFC 
card tap to the phone. Once the NFC card tap has been done, the browser will automatically 
load the requested page. If the browser is in the same mobile phone as the 2FYSH app, the 
                     ISSN: 1693-6930 
TELKOMNIKA  Vol. 17, No. 2, April 2019:  693-702 
698 
user will just have to click the URI link and the 2FYSH app will open directly to the NFC card tap 
prompt page and the rest is the same. 
The 2FYSH app design supports the interface of key list to the users. Key list is a list of 
credentials that had been registered to the 2FYSH app. With the key lists, users can look at the 
credentials they had registered and revoke them whenever they want. A single key is as shown 
in the red box in Figure 2, with a button DELETE on the right to delete the credential. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 2FYSH Mobile App User Interface 
 
 
5.    Analysis 
5.1. Usability Test 
Based on Jakob Nielsen’s mathematical model on usability testing at 1993, only 
minimum 3 to 5 people are needed to address 85% of the usability problem [25].  
The experiment on this paper was conducted to 2 groups of 5 people (total 10 people). The first 
group consists of average users (can operate computers, send email, browsing, work with word 
processors and spreadsheets), and the rest consists of expert users (can write a program, 
install OS). The chosen 10 people were told to try the 2FYSH authentication in desktop and 
mobile. For comparison, we also asked them to try the existing solution on authentication, FIDO 
U2F [18]. The test participants were given the following task: (1) Listen on how to do 2FYSH 
registration, (2) Do the 2FYSH registration, (3) Listen on how to do 2FYSH authentication, (4) 
Do the 2FYSH authentication (first), (5) Do the 2FYSH authentication (second), (6) Listen on 
how to do 2FYSH mobile authentication, (7) Do the 2FYSH mobile authentication, (8) Listen on 
how to do U2F registration, (9) Do the U2F registration, (10) Listen on how to do U2F 
authentication, (11) Do the U2F authentication (first), (12) Do the U2F authentication (second). 
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Each person completed the usability test by 20-30 minutes. Each task was noted on 
how much time spent to complete one task. The interviewer also observed the errors occurred 
during the completion of the task. Based on the usability experiment conducted, here are some 
findings: The average time spent to complete the authentication process decreases from the 
first to the second try. For average users, they only require 16.2 seconds for desktop 
authentication and 11.5 seconds for mobile authentication. Authentication with token is 
generally harder for average users than expert users. However, it in happens not only 2FYSH 
but also U2F. As users use the new authentication system, the error count decreases.  
This indicates that 2FYSH is relatively easy to be learnt. According to the participants, effort to 
authenticate with 2FYSH is at 3.1 from a 11-point Likert scale. Test participants feels that it is 
easy to learn using 2FYSH and u2f authentication.  
Most of test participants prefer U2F when compared to 2FYSH, U2F, password. When 
the test participants were explained the trade-offs between each authentication system in terms 
of security, usability, and economy; 5 test participants choose 2FYSH, and the other 5 test 
participants choose password. When asked, the reasons of them not choosing U2F is because 
the U2F authenticator costs a lot.From the 5 test participants who chose 2FYSH, the reason 
they chose 2FYSH is because 2FYSH is safer and only 2 test participants state that 2FYSH is 
usable.To protect sensitive information, 9 out of 10 test participants prefer to use 2FYSH. There 
are some things that test participants do not like from 2FYSH such as problems concerning 
smartphones and cards. Test participants also think of it as hassles. 
 
5.2. UDS Framework Analysis 
Bonneau et al. [22] evaluated two decades worth of proposal on replacing text 
passwords for general-purpose user authentication on the web, resulting in a comprehensive 
comparative evaluation framework of web authentication schemes. The framework is also called 
Usability-Deployability – Security Framework (UDS Framework). In this paper, we will be using 
their framework to evaluate the security and deployability on our newly proposed authentication 
protocol. In the framework, there will be three possible answers to the benefits. “Yes” if the 
benefit is fully offered, “No” if the benefit is not offered at all, and “Quasi” if the system almost 
offers the benefit [22]. 
 
5.2.1. Security Analysis 
S1 Resilient to Physical Observation [YES]: 2FYSH uses public and private key along with 
a challenge-response scheme to authenticate. Also, the private key is stored in the 
secure element (key store). 
S2 Resilient to Targeted Impersonation [Quasi]: Even with the two tokens, 2FYSH almost 
offer this benefit. However, there is a scenario of social engineering attack where close 
acquaintances, friends, or even family could know the phone security and steal the 
phone along with the NFC card and authenticate in a relatively short time, for example: 
while having a toilet break. Only the average of 14.8 seconds is needed to do 
authentication based on our usability test.  
S3 Resilient to Throttled Guessing [YES]: 2FYSH protocol uses public and private key 
along with a challenge-response scheme to authenticate. Beside the technical defense 
property of the protocol, throttled guessing cannot be done because of the requirement 
of two SYH factor. 
S4 Resilient to Unthrottled Guessing [YES]: 2FYSH protocol uses public and private key 
along with a challenge-response scheme to authenticate. The attackers can 
deliberately send the guessed encrypted challenge along with the salt but will still likely 
to fail because there are a lot of combinations which can be made with asymmetric 
encryption. 
S5 Resilient to Internal Observation [YES]: 2FYSH app stores its private key on the secure 
element (key store) which is safe even if the mobile phone is infected with malware. 
S6 Resilient to Leaks from Other Verifiers [YES]: 2FYSH app creates a key pair for every 
registration process regardless the site and the username. 
S7 Resilient to Phishing [YES]: 2FYSH uses public and private key along with a challenge-
response scheme to authenticate and the only way to solve the challenge is to present 
the registered mobile phone. 
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S8 Resilient to Theft [Quasi]: 2FYSH offers this benefit only to the people who lock their 
phone with some kind of security such as PIN, pattern lock, password, face recognition, 
fingerprint, etc. Otherwise, 2FYSH will just act like traditional key scheme such as car 
keys, which if stolen, it will be vulnerable to attacks. 
S9 No trusted Third Party [YES]: 2FYSH protocol needs 2FYSH server, 2FYSH app, client, 
and NFC card to authenticate. No third party required. 
S10 Requiring Explicit Consent [YES]: 2FYSH authentication requires explicit effort to take 
pictures of QR code and NFC tap. 
 
S11 Unlinkable [YES]: 2FYSH app creates a key pair for every registration process 
regardless the site and the username. 
 
5.2.2. Deployability Analysis 
D1 Accessible [NO]: 2FYSH needs coordinated movement on pressing the button, pointing 
the camera, and tapping the NFC card.  
D2 Negligible Cost per User [Quasi]: The cost for the user to use 2FYSH authentication 
could be free/negligible since mostly the card is provided by the third party such as 
universities, companies, and banks. That is provided only if the users’ phone has 
already equipped with NFC chip in it. 
D3 Server Compatible [NO]: 2FYSH uses specialized scheme on authentication. To 
implement, a 2FYSH server needs to be coded to accept the special parameters as well 
as the database structures. 
D4 Browser Compatible [YES]: 2FYSH protocol can be run on the standard browser which 
supports HTML 5 with Javascript enabled. 
D5 Mature [NO]: 2FYSH protocol is newly developed, there has not been any 
implementation on a real web/app. 
D6 Non-Proprietary [YES]: Free and an open protocol. 
 
5.2.3 Usability Analysis 
U1 Memory-wise Effortless [YES/Quasi]: Quasi memory-wise effortless if a form of SYK 
(e.g.: PIN, password) authentication is used on the phone (Type of everyday used of 
SYK counts as quasi). Totally memory-wise effortless if SYA (e.g.: finger print, face 
recognition) authentication is used on the phone.  
U2 Scalable for Users [YES]: 2FYSH is designed to accommodate this feature. Increasing 
number of credentials require the exact same step to authenticate. 
U3 Nothing to Carry [NO]: 2FYSH is token based, so this benefit is not offered. 
U4 Physically Effortless [NO]: 2FYSH protocol requires user effort for phone unlocking, 
camera aiming, and card tapping 
U5 Easy to Learn [YES]: Based on the experiment conducted on this paper, 2FYSH 
protocol quite easy to learn. 
U6 Efficient to Use [YES]: Based on the experiment conducted on this paper, 2FYSH is 
efficient to use.  
U7 Infrequent Errors [Quasi]: Based on the experiment conducted on this paper, 12.5% of 
users suffer from user technical errors (such as delay in QR scanning or NFC card 
tapping). The errors only effects in delay in the authentication process and do not imply 
failures of the authentication. 
U8 Easy Recovery from Loss [NO]: The design of 2FYSH does not support to recover from 
loss easily. The loss of NFC card will need the third-party card issuer to reissue the 
card and the loss of registered phone will need the relying entity to revoke the old 
phone authority and register it to the new one.  
 
5.3. Omitting the Use of Username 
By completely omitting the use of username for the user, user will never need to type 
anything to register and authenticate anymore. The current proposed 2FYSH protocol does not 
specify how to achieve this yet but, by letting 2FYSH app reads the app ID and determines the 
corresponding credential, the concept can be achieved. So, in order to authenticate, the user 
will just need to take the phone, scan the 2D visual code, and tap the NFC card. However, note 
that the user may need to be prompted on which credential to be chosen when there are more 
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than one credentials in a single app ID on the 2FYSH app. Omitting the use of username will 
definitely strengthen the usability aspect of 2FYSH but weaken the security since username is 
also one form of secret. 
 
6. Conclusion 
According to our experiment, survey, and analysis, 2FYSH is secure yet usable. 2FYSH 
protects the user from usual password attacks such as man-in-the-middle attack, phishing, 
eavesdropping, brute forcing, shoulder surfing, key logging, and verifier leaking. 2FYSH is 
generally fast for authentication with a high success rate. For average users, they only require 
16.2 seconds for desktop authentication and 11.5 seconds for mobile authentication. 2FYSH is 
easy to learn and prefered to protect sensitive information over U2F token and passwords. This 
fact makes 2FYSH best applied to secure sensitive data needs such as bank accounts and 
corporate secrets. However, there are some things that test participants do not like and possible 
for future works such as the need of using 2 tokens (smartphone and card) and the method to 
authenticate which still considered by some as a hassle.  
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